VOLUME 4 NUMBER 7
Human Rights Digest
INSIDE…
Decisions Noted
SCC Rules that Arbitrators Can
Enforce Human Rights . . . . . . . . . . 1
Code Cannot be Used to Declare
Other Legislation Invalid . . . . . . . . 4
City of Vancouver is Employer of
Police Dispatchers . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Disabled Employees Have Right to
Buy-Out. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Tribunal Will Proceed with Late-
Filed Complaint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Tribunal Refuses to Dismiss
Complaint Against Co-Tenant . . . . 7
Strata Corporation Discriminates
Based on Disability. . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Discrimination Against Mother with
Teenaged Sons. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Late Complaint Can Proceed. . . . . . . . 8
Shipping Agency Not Federal . . . . . . . 9
Human Rights System in Transition. . . 9
Man Denied Tenancy Because of
Disability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Inside Page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Briefly Noted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Ordering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
SCC Rules that Arbitrators Can Enforce
Human Rights
BOARDS OF ARBITRATION / LABOUR
RELATIONS BOARDS — TRADE UNIONS
— authority to hear case arising out of collective
agreement — court of competent
jurisdiction to determine whether contract
provision contravenes human rights legislation
— application of human rights legislation
— JURISDICTION — jurisdiction to
hear complaint concerning employment
relationship governed by collective agreement
EMPLOYMENT — contracting out of employment
standards legislation — protection
from discrimination for probationary
employee — HUMAN RIGHTS — probationary
employee protected by human
rights legislation
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS —
COURTS — standard of review of court
over administrative tribunals — APPEALS
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW — reasons for
decision are patently unreasonable
INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES — legislative
history and legislative intent as
aids to interpretation
In Parry Sound (Dist.) Social Services Administration
Board v. O.P.S.E.U., Local 324
the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that a
grievance arbitrator has the power and responsibility
to enforce the substantive
rights and obligations of human rights and
other employment-related statutes as if
they were part of the collective agreement.
Joanne O’Brien was a probationary employee
of the District of Parry Sound Social
Services Administration Board and a member
of the Ontario Public Service Employees
Union, Local 324 (“O.P.S.E.U.”). Her terms
of employment were governed by a collec-
October 2003
tive agreement negotiated between the
parties.
The collective agreement provided in
Article 5 that “a claim by an employee who
has successfully completed his/her probationary
period that she/he has been disciplined,
suspended or discharged without
just cause may be the subject of a grievance”
(emphasis added). Article 8.06(a)
stated that “ a probationary employee may
be discharged at the sole discretion of ...
the Employer and such action is not subject
to . . . grievance and arbitration procedures.”
Prior to the expiry of her probationary
term, Ms. O’Brien went on maternity leave.
Within a few days of returning to work, the
employer discharged her. She filed a
grievance with the Union alleging that her
discharge was discriminatory because it
was pregnancy-related.
The majority of the Board of Arbitration
found that the collective agreement, considered
alone, imposed no restriction on
the right of the employer to discharge probationary
employees. However, the Board
considered the impact of s. 48(12)(j) of the
Labour Relations Act, which states that an
arbitrator has the power “to interpret and
apply human rights and any other employment-
related statutes, despite any conflict
between these statutes and the terms of
the collective agreement”. Section 5 of the
Human Rights Code prohibits any employment-
related discrimination based on sex,
and s. 44 of the Employment Standards Act
prohibits dismissing an employee because
she is pregnant or takes pregnancy leave.
The majority of the Board of Arbitration
ruled that it had jurisdiction to hear the
grievance because the Labour Relations
Act imports the substantive rights under
continued on page 3
Human Rights Digest Vol. 4 No. 7
Inside Page
The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Parry Sound (Dist.) Social Services Administration
Board v. O.P.S.E.U., Local 324 has important implications for human
rights administration and for arbitrators.
It represents a new development in the human rights jurisprudence about the
application of human rights law to the interpretation of collective agreements.
Winnipeg School Div. No. 1 v. Craton (6 C.H.R.R. D/3014) established that employers
and unions cannot contract out of human rights law. Central Okanagan
School Dist. No. 23 v. Renaud (16 C.H.R.R. D/425) established that employers and
unions have joint liability where provisions of a collective agreement cause discrimination.
In Parry Sound, the Court ruled that the substantive rights and obligations
are incorporated into each collective agreement over which an arbitrator has jurisdiction.
This affects the scope of the arbitrator’s jurisdiction, permitting him to deal,
in this case, with a grievance filed by a probationary employee — who would otherwise
not be allowed to grieve a discharge — because the employee alleged a human
rights violation.
This decision is welcome. It reinforces the principle established earlier that no
contract can fall below the standards set by human rights law, and, newly, it makes
arbitration more accessible as an avenue of resort for the most vulnerable of unionized
workers.
What the Court did not decide was whether arbitrators and human rights tribunals
have concurrent jurisdiction. In fact, Justice Iacobucci, who wrote for the
majority, explicitly decided not to rule on whether the jurisdiction of the Commission
was ousted by that of the Board of Arbitration, although the Ontario Human
Rights Commission, which intervened, asked the Court to rule on this point.
Concurrent jurisdiction for commissions and arbitrators is essential. The objectives
of the labour relations scheme and the human rights scheme are different.
While the goals of the labour relations system are to ensure peace in industrial relations
and to protect employees from the misuse of managerial power, the goals of
the human rights system are to make victims of discrimination whole and to eliminate
discrimination from the social fabric. These very different goals dictate different
remedies. Arbitration is not likely to be a venue for obtaining an order that an
employment equity program be put in place, for example. This means that, even
though the decision in Parry Sound is welcome, it needs to be accompanied by
recognition from the Court that commissions need to retain jurisdiction, and that
workers should not be denied access to human rights avenues just because they
are covered by a collective agreement.
Also, although the Court was satisfied that arbitrators have, or can gain, the
necessary expertise to interpret and apply human rights law if it becomes a more
central component of their jurisdiction, this is not something about which we can
be complacent. In general, arbitrators do not have adequate training in human
rights jurisprudence, and too few have human rights expertise to start with. Parry
Sound provides a new reason for ensuring that arbitrators have thorough human
rights training and for choosing arbitrators who have substantial knowledge of human
rights law.
Human Rights Digest
is a publication of the Canadian Human
Rights Reporter, a non-profit organization
established to provide access to human
rights law in Canada, primarily through
publications and research services of
interest to professionals in the human
rights, legal, human resources, and related
fields, as well as to the general public.
Human Rights Digest provides summaries
and digests of recent tribunal and court
human rights decisions from all jurisdictions
in Canada.
Access to printed and electronic versions
of the full text of human rights decisions is
available from the Canadian Human Rights
Reporter.
EDITORIAL BOARD:
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Gwen Brodsky, D. Jur.
Ken Norman, B.C.L.
Béatrice Vizkelety, LL.M.
Nitya Iyer, LL.M.
EDITORS:
Barbara Hopkins, M.L.S.
Gaylyn Young, LL.B.
Canadian Human Rights Reporter
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Written, printed and typeset in Canada
Vol. 4 No. 7 Human Rights Digest
continued from page 1
the Human Rights Code into the collective
agreement. A dissenting member of the-
Board of Arbitration found, however, that
there is nothing wrong with an employer
and a union agreeing that they will not arbitrate
the discharge of a probationary employee.
If any rights of the employee were
infringed, she was free to pursue her rights
in a human rights forum.
On appeal of this decision, the Ontario
Divisional Court ruled that the Board of Arbitration
erred. It determined that the Labour
Relations Act confers the power to interpret
and apply the Human Rights Code
and other employment-related statutes
when the arbitration board has jurisdiction,
but not otherwise. Because the collective
agreement states that the discharge of a
probationary employee does not constitute
a disagreement between the parties, the
grievor chose the wrong forum.
The Court of Appeal (40 C.H.R.R.
D/190), however, considered that the
power given to arbitrators to apply the Human
Rights Code and other employment-
related statutes does have a bearing on the
arbitrator’s jurisdiction. In this case, the
right of the employer under the collective
agreement to discharge a probationary employee
for any reason was in conflict with s.
5 of the Human Rights Code. The agreement
should be read as though it did not
include the power to discharge on the basis
of pregnancy or pregnancy-related factors.
The Court of Appeal found that this interpretation
could have incongruous results
because an arbitrator would have jurisdiction
where collective agreement terms conflicted
with the Human Rights Code, but
not where the collective agreement was
silent. Section 48(12)(j) stops short of making
the statutory provisions referred to in it
part of the collective agreement.
Because of this concern, the Court of
Appeal declined to decide the matter based
on s. 48(12)(j) of the Labour Relations Act.
Instead, the Court ruled on the basis of s.
64.5(1) of the Employment Standards Act,
which directly imports s. 44 of that Act into
collective agreements. Section 44 prohibits
dismissal of any employee, including a probationary
employee, for pregnancy or
pregnancy-related reasons. It is not open to
the parties to contract out of the Employment
Standards Act. The Court of Appeal
Key Words
‘ ’’
[I]n its submissions before this Court the intervener, Human Rights Commission, stated that it believes that the grievance arbitration process has an important role to play in the resolution of human rights issues. It did not intervene on
the basis that arbitrators should not have the power to resolve human rights
issues, but on the basis that arbitrators and the Board [of Inquiry] should have
concurrent jurisdiction. This suggests that the Commission also is of the view
that grievance arbitrators have sufficient expertise to hear alleged violations of
the Human Rights Code.
Parry Sound (Dist.) Social Services Administration Board v. O.P.S.E.U., Local 324
allowed the appeal on these grounds.
The Supreme Court of Canada found
that the principal questions before it were:
(1) is Ms. O’Brien’s grievance arbitrable; (2)
are the substantive rights and obligations
of the Human Rights Code incorporated
into each collective agreement; and (3) is
the grievance arbitrable because the substantive
rights and obligations of the Employment
Standards Act are incorporated
into each collective agreement.
In this case, the Supreme Court determined
that the standard of review to be applied
was correctness. Although “patent
unreasonableness” is the standard usually
applied when an arbitrator’s decision is being
reviewed, in this case, the majority
found that the central question — whether
the rights in the Code are incorporated into
each collective agreement — is a question
of law, making correctness the appropriate
standard of review.
The Supreme Court determined, based
on prior case law and on s. 48(12)(j), that it
is only when a probationary employee is
discharged for a lawful reason that there is
no grievable difference between the parties.
Any exercise of management discretion
that is not in accordance with a probationary
employee’s rights under the Human
Rights Code and other employment-related
statutes is an arbitrable difference under
the collective agreement. Human rights
and employment standards legislation set a
standard below which parties cannot contract.
The substantive rights and obligations
of human rights and other employment-
related statutes are part of each
collective agreement, and an arbitrator has
(2003), CHRR Doc. 03-209 at § 54
the power to enforce them.
The Board of Arbitration was correct to
conclude that the substantive rights and
obligations of the Human Rights Code are
incorporated into each collective agreement
over which an arbitrator has jurisdiction.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court
found no reason to interfere with the
Board’s finding that the subject matter of
Ms. O’Brien’s grievance is arbitrable.
Further, even if there were no basis on
which to conclude that an alleged violation
of the Human Rights Code is arbitrable, as
the Court of Appeal ruled, s. 44 of the Employment
Standards Act would provide
sufficient grounds to conclude that Ms.
O’Brien’s claim could be the subject of a
grievance.
The appeal was dismissed.
In dissent, Major J. stated that he would
have allowed the appeal. Parties should be
permitted to set out the limits of their agreements.
Unless the legislature passes legislation
incorporating the substance of its
statutes into collective agreements, it should
be assume that unions and employers may
define which employees and disputes are
covered by a collective agreement, as long
as the agreement does not conflict with
statute or public policy. The courts should
not on their own initiative interfere with the
terms of a collective agreement.
Parry Sound (Dist.) Social Services
Administration Board v.
O.P.S.E.U., Local 324 (Sept. 18,
2003), CHRR Doc. 03-209, 2003
SCC 42 (Eng. 19 pp.) [To be reported
in 47 C.H.R.R.]
Human Rights Digest Vol. 4 No. 7
Code Cannot be Used to Declare Other Legislation Invalid
JURISDICTION — authority to make gencompensation
legislation. When the comeral
declaration on validity of other legislation
— jurisdiction to order remedy
HUMAN RIGHTS — human rights legislation
conflicts with another enactment —
jurisdictional comparison of human rights
legislation — limitation on application of
human rights legislation — nature and
purpose of human rights legislation
INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES — case
law
The Newfoundland Board of Inquiry ruled
that it did not have jurisdiction to provide
the remedy requested by three women
who claimed that they were discriminated
against by a provision of the Workplace
Health Safety and Compensation Commission
Act (“WHSCC Act”) that disentitled
them from receiving widow’s pensions.
Anna Haby, Theresa Quilty and Betty
Stacey alleged that they were discriminated
against by the Workplace Health Safety
and Compensation Commission (“WHSCC”)
and the Government of Newfoundland
because of provisions in the Newfoundland
WHSCC Act regarding eligibility
for benefits of the widows of injured workers
who remarried.
The husbands of the three complainants
died in industrial accidents. Ms. Stacey’s
husband died in 1960, Ms. Quilty’s in
1969, and Ms. Haby’s in 1973. After their
husbands’ deaths, the widows received
pensions under the governing workers’
— job classification system discriminatory
— similar work — wage disparity among
emergency dispatchers — relationship between
equal pay and sex discrimination —
HUMAN RIGHTS — nature and purpose
of human rights legislation
EMPLOYMENT — employment relationship
between complainant and respondent
— employee classification — definition of
employer and employment — TRADE
UNIONS — collective bargaining process
plainants remarried, their benefits were cut
off.
In 1993, the WHSCC determined that
widows who remarried were entitled to
continue receiving their
pension benefits. The complainants’
benefits were reinstated
as of January 1,
1993.
In November 2000 a
Task Force appointed to assess
the workers’ compensation
regime in Newfoundland
recommended
that full retroactive benefits
be provided to all widows
who remarried on or after April 17,
1985, the date on which the equality provision
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms came into force. The WHSCC
Act was amended to give effect to the Task
Force’s recommendation. Section 65.1(1)
of the Act states: “A person whose
monthly allowance as a surviving dependent
spouse was terminated on or after
April 17, 1985 due to his or her remarriage
is entitled to receive the compensation that
he or she would have received had the
monthly allowance not been terminated”.
Pursuant to this provision, the complainants
were denied reinstatement of
benefits for the period from 1985–1993
because they remarried prior to April 17,
1985, rather than on or after that date.
The Board of Inquiry considered and
distinguished other cases in which a claim
nition of “employer” and “employment”
— purposive approach
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS —
COURTS — judicial review powers of
court over administrative tribunals — standard
of review of court over administrative
tribunals — privative clause — APPEALS
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW — error of law in
findings on the evidence — findings of fact
are patently unreasonable
The Newfoundland
Code does not create a
mechanism for
determining the validity
of allegedly
discriminatory
provincial legislation.
was made that human rights legislation
conflicted with, and should take precedence
over, other statutory provisions. The
Board considered Gwinner (44 C.H.R.R.
D/52), O’Quinn (27 C.HR.R. D/437), and
Gale Estate. It found that
the effect of the remedy
sought by the complainants
would be to render
inoperative s. 65(1) of
the WHSCC Act, and that
providing this remedy
would be in excess of the
jurisdiction of the Board.
Relying on the decision of
Mr. Justice Huband of the
Manitoba Court of Appeal
in Gale Estate, the Board determined that
the Newfoundland Human Rights Code
was not “intended as an instrument to
strike down or rewrite legislation”. The
Code does not create a mechanism for determining
the validity of allegedly discriminatory
provincial legislation. While the
complainants did not seek a declaration
that s. 65.1(1) is invalid, the Board found
that granting them a remedy would have
that effect.
The complaint was dismissed.
Haby v. Newfoundland and
Labrador (Workplace Health Safety
and Compensation Comm.) (June
16, 2003), CHRR Doc. 03-189
(N.L. Bd.Inq.; Morrow) [To be reported
in 47 C.H.R.R.]
The B.C. Supreme Court overturned the
B.C. Human Rights Tribunal’s decision (37
C.H.R.R. D/218) to dismiss the human
rights complaints of ninety-six women
against the City of Vancouver and the Vancouver
Police Board. It ruled that the Tribunal
erred when it determined that the
City of Vancouver was not the employer of
dispatchers working in the Vancouver Police
Department.
The women alleged that they were paid
less as dispatchers for the Vancouver Police
Department than men performing similar
City of Vancouver is Employer of Police Dispatchers
EQUAL PAY — SEX DISCRIMINATION INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES — defi
Vol. 4 No. 7 Human Rights Digest
The Tribunal erred when
it ruled that the City of
Vancouver was not the
employer of police
dispatchers, since the
City paid the salaries of
these dispatchers and no
remedy could be provided
for sex discrimination
without the City’s
involvement.
Disabled Employees Have Right to Buy-Out
BENEFITS — eligibility for buyout pro-view of court over administrative tribunals
work for the Vancouver Fire Department.
The complaints were filed under both ss.
12 and 13 of the B.C. Human Rights Code.
Section 12 prohibits an employer from paying
women less than men for performing
similar or substantially similar work. Section
13 prohibits employers from discriminating
with respect to terms or conditions of work
on the basis of sex.
The Tribunal ruled that the dispatchers
who work for the Vancouver Police Department
(who were called communications
operators) and the dispatchers who work
for the Vancouver Fire Department did not
have the same employer. The City of Vancouver
was the employer of the fire dispatchers.
However, the Vancouver Police
Board employed the police dispatchers.
While the Tribunal found that the City
of Vancouver provided the overall budget
for the Vancouver Police Department, it
also found that the City did not determine
the wages of the police dispatchers. The
wage rates of civilian employees in the Police
Department were determined through
collective bargaining and by a classification
plan. The collective agreement covering
the police dispatchers was negotiated between
the complainants’ union and the Police
Board, not the City. Since the police dispatchers
and the fire dispatchers did not
have the same employer, the Tribunal ruled
that the complainants failed to establish a
violation of s. 12 of the Code.
Despite its ruling on this threshold issue,
the Tribunal indicated how it would have
ruled on the s. 12 and 13 issues, had the female
and male employees had a common
employer.
gram — DISABILITY — disabled employees
entitled to same benefits as other employees
— TRADE UNIONS — collective
agreement includes discriminatory provision
— union supports discriminatory policy
— LIABILITY — liability of union —
joint liability
APPEALS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW — error
of law in determining liability — ADMINISTRATIVE
TRIBUNALS — COURTS
— judicial review powers of court over administrative
tribunals — standard of re-
The Tribunal found that the work of a
Communications Operator I was substantially
similar to the work of a Fire Dispatcher
I. The jobs were not identical but there was
no difference between the two positions
sufficient to justify a wage disparity. However,
the Tribunal determined
that the differences
in the skill, effort and responsibility
required for a
Communications Operator
II and a Fire Dispatcher
III were sufficient to justify
a wage disparity.
With respect to s. 13 of
the Code, the Tribunal
concluded that the complainants
also failed here-
because they could not
establish that they had the
same employer as the
group to whom they
wished to compare themselves.
Further, the Tribunal
rejected their claim that when the
police dispatcher jobs were “civilianized”,
and were no longer performed principally
by police officers, the jobs became
“women’s jobs” and had lower pay attached
to them. The Tribunal found that
this was an oversimplification and the claim
was not supported by evidence.
The Tribunal dismissed the complaints.
On appeal, the B.C. Supreme Court
found that when the Tribunal ruled that the
City of Vancouver was not the employer of
the Police Department dispatchers it failed
to take into account the fact that the City
paid the salaries of these employees and no
— BURDEN OF PROOF — elements of a
prima facie case
DISCRIMINATION — Meiorin test — adverse
effect discrimination — definition of
discrimination—REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION
— union’s duty to accommodate
— duty to accommodate in case of
adverse effect discrimination — Meiorin
test for reasonable accommodation
The Alberta Court of Appeal upheld decisions
of the Alberta Human Rights Panel
remedy for their claim could be provided
unless the City was involved. While the Tribunal
found that the City could not independently
remedy the wage gap, because
of the Police Board’s responsibility for bargaining
and classification, it did not address
the fact that the Police
Board could not independently
remedy the wage
disparity either. The Tribunal
did not give a large
and purposive interpretation
to the definition of
employer in this case.
The Court referred the
complaints under s. 12
back to the Tribunal for
reconsideration in light of
these reasons. It also permitted
the parties to present
further submissions
regarding the Tribunal’s
finding on the s. 12 complaints.
The appeal of the Tribunal’s s. 13 finding
was dismissed on the grounds that the
complainants had presented insufficient
evidence to prove that the “civilianization”
of the police dispatcher positions had resulted
in sex discrimination. The pay for
these civilianized positions was lower because
the dispatch jobs were no longer performed
by police constables.
Vancouver (City) v. Reid (No. 2)
(Sept. 3, 2003), CHRR Doc.
03-203, 2003 BCSC 1348
(Garson J.) (Eng. 37 pp.) [To be
reported in 47 C.H.R.R.]
(35 C.H.R.R. D/478) and the Court of
Queen’s Bench (44 C.H.R.R. D/272),
which ruled that Canada Safeway and the
United Food and Commercial Workers, Local
401 (“U.F.C.W.”) discriminated against
disabled employees by excluding them
from participation in a buy-out plan.
In March 1993, Canada Safeway and
the U.F.C.W. negotiated the terms of a
buyout package. Full-time and part-time
employees in Alberta were eligible if their
rate of pay was $10 an hour or more, and if
they had worked some hours over the last
52 weeks. Ms. Starzynski and her co-com
Human Rights Digest Vol. 4 No. 7
Eligibility for the buy-out
plan should have been
based on seniority only,
not on hours worked in
the last 52 weeks. The
added criteria of recent
hours worked had the
effect of excluding those
on disability leave.
Tribunal Will Proceed with Late-Filed Complaint
COMPLAINTS — timeliness in filing comrespondent’s
application to dismiss a complainants
were on disability leave and were
denied access to the buyout package because
they had not worked sufficient hours
in the 52-week qualifying period.
The negotiations between Canada
Safeway and the Union occurred at a time
when the company considered that it was
in a difficult financial situation. Approximately
8–9,000 employees and 80 percent
of the full-time employees were at the top
of their pay scale and labour costs were
high. The buyout package offered employees
a lump sum payment and the option to
either terminate their employment or to
continue their employment in the status of
newly hired employees without their seniority
and at a significantly reduced level
of pay. When an employee accepted the
buyout, the employer received the employee’s
average weekly hours as “bought
hours” which could be allotted to a new
hire with a significantly lower rate of pay.
Over 3,500 employees accepted the
buyout package, with an estimated $75
million in savings flowing to the employer.
However, about 15 employees who were
on disability leave were excluded. After the
agreement had been made, the Union realized
that there were employees with disabilities
who were negatively affected by its
terms, and Union officials made some efforts
to rectify the problem. They made
representations to the company, but were
unsuccessful in obtaining agreement from
Canada Safeway to buy out the hours of
these employees.
As a result of the rules governing eligibility
for the buyout package, Ms. Starzynski
and her disabled co-workers had no option
but to continue working for Canada
Safeway at a reduced rate of pay. The Human
Rights Panel found that the rules were
discriminatory.
The Court of Queen’s Bench agreed. It
determined that the purpose of Canada
Safeway’s buyout package was to reduce
plaint — limitation of action provision in
human rights legislation — PUBLIC INTEREST
— accepting out-of-time complaint
The B.C. Human Rights Tribunal rejected a
the number of senior employees who were
being paid more than $10 an hour. Given
this purpose, using hours worked within
the 52 weeks prior to the buyout announcement
was not an appropriate basis
for determining eligibility. A consideration
of hours worked in the 52-week period was
a sound basis for determining the amount
of the lump-sum payment
each employee was offered,
but not for determining
eligibility for the
buyout.
The Court of Queen’s
Bench also agreed with
the Panel’s finding that the
Union was jointly liable
with the employer. The
Union argued that it had
accepted the reopening of
the collective agreement
and the negotiation of the
buyout plan “with a gun
at its head”, and that it did not have equal
bargaining power in the circumstances. It
also approached the employer on behalf of
the complainants and made genuine efforts
to persuade the employer to include
the 15 disabled employees in the plan.
The Court of Queen’s Bench found,
however, that where a union has negotiated
a provision it must take equal responsibility
for it. The Union did not demonstrate,
in the Court’s view, that it had
accommodated the complainants to the
point of undue hardship.
The Court of Appeal found that the two
criteria which circumscribed the group eligible
for the buy-out were seniority and
having worked some hours in the last 52
weeks. The Court of Appeal agreed with
the court and tribunal below that, for purposes
of determining eligibility for the buyout,
only seniority (as defined by rate of
pay) mattered. The buy-out was more akin
to a seniority provision like that considered
plaint on the grounds that it was not filed
within the time limits set out in the new
Human Rights Code.
In June 2003, Roseanna Chartier filed a
complaint on behalf of her son, Ryan Bissonnette,
against Sooke School District No.
in O.N.A. v. Orillia Soldiers Memorial Hospital
(36 C.H.R.R. D/202). It permitted senior
employees to determine the form their
future participation in the workplace would
take.
As the negotiation of the buyout plan
proceeded, the only senior employees who
were excluded were those who were ab
sent from work because
of disability. The Court of
Appeal affirmed that the
complainants had made
out a prima facie case of
discrimination.
The Court of Appeal
also found that neither
the employer nor the
union had accommodated
the complainants to
the point of undue hardship.
The amount of
money involved in extending
the buyout plan
to the disabled employees was “miniscule”
in comparison to the savings to the employer
which the plan generated. The employer
also accommodated other employees
whose buyout status was affected by
extended vacation, early retirement, and
other factors.
Although the Union did raise the matter
of the exclusion of disabled employees
with the employer, and requested some accommodation,
the Court of Appeal upheld
the findings of the tribunal and court below
that the Union had not accommodated the
disabled employees to the point of undue
hardship.
The appeal was dismissed.
Canada Safeway Ltd. v. Alberta
(Human Rights Comm.) (Aug. 13,
2003), CHRR Doc. 03-196, 2003
ABCA 246 (McFayden, Berger and
Ritter JJ.A.) (Eng. 11 pp.) [To be reported
in 47 C.H.R.R.]
62 and Paula Unger. Ms. Chartier alleged
that in May 2002 her son was refused a
part in a school play because he has
epilepsy, and that he was discriminated
against based on disability.
Under the provisions of the new Human
Rights Code, a complaint must be filed
Vol. 4 No. 7 Human Rights Digest
Tribunal Refuses to Dismiss Complaint against Co-Tenant
COMPLAINTS — dismissal of complaint a complaint against him on the grounds
Strata Corporation Discriminates Based on Disability
DISABILITY — definition of physical dis-When Halina Konieczna purchased her
within 6 months of the time when the discrimination
occurred. The Tribunal can
waive this time limit if it is in the public interest
to do so and no substantial prejudice
is caused because of the delay. In this case,
the respondents’ ability to answer the complaint
was not compromised.
The Tribunal noted that there had been
negotiations between the parties to settle
the matter, during which the School District
— PARTIES — proper person named as respondent
— PROCEDURE — statement of
claim to disclose reasonable cause of action
HOUSING ACCOMMODATION — harassment
of tenant — SEXUAL HARASSMENT
— sexual advances by co-tenant
The B.C. Human Rights Tribunal rejected
an application by Walter Hrycan to dismiss
ability includes allergies — discriminatory
treatment in the provision of housing accommodation
on the basis of allergies —
HOUSING ACCOMMODATION
strata property rules discriminate on the
basis of disability
PUBLIC SERVICES AND FACILITIES
definition of services — strata corporation
— JURISDICTION — jurisdiction to hear
complaint concerning strata property —
INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES — definition
of “customarily available to the
public” and “service”
DAMAGES — compensation for injury to
dignity and self-respect — REMEDIES
amendment of strata property by-laws
The B.C. Human Rights Tribunal ruled that
the owners of Strata Plan NW2489 (La Mirage)
discriminated against Halina Konieczna
because of a disability by not allowing
her to replace the carpet in her condominium
with hardwood flooring.
had legal representation, but Ms. Chartier
did not. While the complaint was filed 13
months after the alleged incident, it was
filed as soon as Ms. Chartier obtained legal
representation.
In these circumstances, the Tribunal
found that there was a public interest in fair
access to the Tribunal. When an unrepresented
person engages in negotiations to
resolve a human rights issue, fairness dic
that there was no cause of action. Jean Diane
Davis alleged that Walter Hrycan, who
was a tenant — as she was — of Robert
Leeper, sexually harassed her and induced
Mr. Leeper to evict her.
Mr. Hrycan contended that as a co-tenanthe
had no ability to influence Ms. Davis’
conditions of tenancy and the complaint
against him should be dismissed. The Tribunal
found that if Ms. Davis’ allegations
that Mr. Hrycan had influenced Mr. Lee-
per’s treatment of her were true, a violation
unit it had wall-to-wall carpeting on all the
floors except those in the kitchen and two
bathrooms. In July 2000
— Ms. Konieczna requested
permission to replace the
carpeting with hardwood
flooring. She has a severe
— allergy to latex, which is
present in all machine-
manufactured carpeting,
as well as sensitivities to
mould, dust mites and
formaldehyde. Ms. Konieczna’s
medical specialists
advised that removal
of the carpeting would
— assist in the management
of her allergies and asthma.
Her request to put in
hardwood floors was denied
by the strata corporation, which required
her to comply with the Flooring Bylaw.
This by-law stated that wall-to-wall
carpeting was the only allowable floor
covering.
tates that the person should have the opportunity
to file a complaint within a reasonable
period of time past the 6-month
time limit.
Chartier v. Sooke School Dist. No.
62 (July 30, 2003), CHRR Doc.
03-179, 2003 BCHRT 39 (Mac-
Naughton) (Eng. 5 pp.) [To be
reported in 47 C.H.R.R.]
of s. 10 of the Human Rights Code might
have occurred.
The Tribunal decided that the complaint
should proceed to hearing where a Tribunal
member can determine, on the basis of evidence,
the nature of the relationships between
Mr. Leeper and Mr. Hrycan, and Mr.
Hrycan and Ms. Davis.
Davis v. Hrycan (July 30, 2003),
CHRR Doc. 03-178, 2003 BCHRT
40 (Humphreys) (Eng. 6 pp.) [To be
reported in 47 C.H.R.R.]
The Tribunal rejected the strata corporation’s
argument that it did not provide a
service customarily available to the public.
The Tribunal relied on decisions
in Ganser v. Rosewood
Estates Condominium
Corp. (No. 1) (42
C.H.R.R. D/264) and Williams
v. Strata Council
No. 768 (46 C.H.R.R.
D/326), in which adjudicators
found that there is
a public relationship between
a condominium
corporation and unit owners.
The corporation provides
services, generally in
relation to the upkeep,
development and maintenance
of the property, and
the resident owners are
the users of those services. In this case, the
enforcement of the Flooring By-law, which
related to noise control and management,
and the maintenance and protection of the
quiet use and enjoyment of individual
The Flooring By-law,
which permitted only
wall to wall carpeting in
the strata units, while
neutral on its face and
applying equally to
everyone, adversely
affected Ms. Konieczna
because of her allergy to
latex, and her sensitivities
to dust mites and mould.
Human Rights Digest Vol. 4 No. 7
Discrimination Against Mother with Teenaged Sons
HOUSING ACCOMMODATION — by the Superintendent, Mr. Meakes. The
A landlord cannot
refuse to rent to
tenants with teenaged
children, regardless of
the size of the unit.
Late Complaint Can Proceed
COMPLAINTS — timeliness in filing commotion
by Canada Safeway to dismiss a
strata units, was a part of the service provided
to the owners.
The Tribunal accepted that Ms. Konieczna
has a disability within the meaning
of the Code. The respondent did not dispute
this. In this situation, the Flooring Bylaw,
while neutral on its face and applying
equally to everyone, adversely affected
Ms. Konieczna because of her disability.
Prior to the hearing the parties agreed
that, if the Tribunal found a prima facie
rental accommodation denied on the basis
of family status — FAMILY STATUS
child excluded from residing in apartment
— rental accommodation denied to parent
— AGE DISCRIMINATION — under 20
age group
DISCRIMINATION — intention to discriminate
— BURDEN OF PROOF — elements
of a prima facie case — RETALIATION
— definition of reprisal — HUMAN
RIGHTS — nature and purpose of human
rights legislation
LIABILITY — personal liability — REMEDIES
— prohibition on using age criteria
for tenants
The Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario
ruled that Boolean Developments and Edmond
Lee discriminated against Maria Cunanan
on the basis of family status by refusing
to rent a three-bedroom apartment
to her and her three teenaged sons.
In June 1998 Ms. Cunanan was living in
a three-bedroom apartment in which she
and her eldest son each had their own bedrooms,
and the two younger boys shared
the third. Looking for a change, she was
shown an apartment at 30 Godstone Road
plaint — limitation of action provision in
human rights legislation — PUBLIC INTEREST
— accepting out-of-time complaint
The B.C. Human Rights Tribunal rejected a
case of discrimination, the respondent
would not raise the defence of reasonable
and bona fide justification. The Tribunal
ruled that the respondent strata corporation
had contravened the Code.
The Tribunal ordered the strata corporation
of La Mirage to permit Ms. Konieczna
to install hardwood flooring at her own expense
with adequate underlay for sound
insulation; to pay her $3,500 as compensation
for the injury to her dignity; and to en-
Godstone Road apartment was about the
— same size as the one Ms. Cunanan was living
in, but it cost less and it was well located.
Ms. Cunanan wanted to rent it. She
visited the office for 30 Goldstone Rd. and
spoke to the owner Mr. Edmond Lee. She
filled out an application form.
Ms. Cunanan returned a
few days later to check on
the processing of her application.
Mr. Lee told her he
could not find her application.
Ms. Cunanan offered to
fill out another one, but Mr.
Lee refused to allow her to
do so. After talking with Mr. Meakes again,
Ms. Cunanan began to feel that perhaps
she was being discriminated against because
she had three teenaged sons. She
contacted the Centre for Equality Rights in
Accommodation, and an advocate from
that office contacted Mr. Lee on her behalf.
He told Mr. Lee that Ms. Cunanan wanted
to fill out another application form and to
have it considered in a non-discriminatory
manner. Mr. Lee refused again to allow Ms.
Cunanan to fill out another application.
The Tribunal rejected the respondents’
argument that Ms. Cunanan was not
turned away because she had teenaged
complaint filed by Maria Ainscough because
it was filed out of time.
At issue were the terms of a Buyout
Agreement negotiated between Canada
Safeway and the United Food and Commercial
Workers, Local 1518 (“U.F.C.W.”).
sure that she is not the subject of any special
levy or charges for payment of the
monetary award ordered by the Tribunal or
for any legal costs of the strata corporation.
Konieczna v. Owners Strata Plan
NW2489 (No. 2) (July 29, 2003),
CHRR Doc. 03-177, 2003 BCHRT
38 (Beharrell) (Eng. 21 pp.) [To be
reported in 47 C.H.R.R.]
sons but because she was troublesome.
The Tribunal found that Mr. Lee did have a
general guideline or policy for matching
units with families and that Ms. Cunanan
and her teenaged sons were not an “ideal”
family under this formula.
The Tribunal found that Ms. Cunanan
was discriminated against
because she had teenaged
children. The law requires
landlords to rent to tenants
with teenaged children,
regardless of the size
of the unit, unless there
are lawful reasons for refusing
to rent.
The Tribunal ordered Boolean Developments
and Edmond Lee to pay Ms. Cunanan
$4,000 for the loss arising out the
infringement of her rights. It also ordered
the respondent to cease discriminating on
the basis of family status, and to cease refusing
to rent to prospective tenants because
they have three teenaged children
who will occupy a three-bedroom unit.
Cunanan v. Boolean Developments
Ltd. (Aug. 27, 2003), CHRR
Doc. 03-200, 2003 HRTO 17 (Kim)
(Eng. 18 pp.) [To be reported in 47
C.H.R.R.]
The Buyout Agreement required all inactive
employees (for example, those on long-
term disability, maternity or parental leave)
to work for three weeks prior to December
31, 1999, in order to be eligible for the
buyout. Ms. Ainscough did not work the
required three weeks.
Vol. 4 No. 7 Human Rights Digest
The Public Guardian and Trustee filed a
complaint on Ms. Ainscough’s behalf in
June 2002 alleging that the eligibility rules
for the buyout discriminated against her on
the grounds of disability. The new Human
Rights Code reduced the time period for filing
a complaint from one year after the occurrence
of the discrimination to six
months. Under these provisions, Ms. Ainscough
should have filed her complaint by
July 2000. The Code permits the Tribunal to
make exceptions to this time limit where it is
federally — divided jurisdiction for transportation
The B.C. Human Rights Tribunal rejected
an application made by the respondent
Prism Sulphur Corporation for dismissal of
a complaint filed against it by Robert Andrew.
Mr. Andrew alleged that he was discriminated
against in employment because
of a disability. The corporation sought dismissal
of the complaint on the grounds that
it was a federal undertaking not subject to
B.C. human rights legislation and consequently
the B.C. Human Rights Tribunal
had no jurisdiction.
Robert Andrew was the General Manager
of Maple Shipping, a division of Can-
world Shipping Company. Canworld is a
wholly-owned subsidiary of Prism Sulphur
Corporation. Maple Shipping is an agency
that provides vessel-brokering services,
filing complaint — limitation of action
provision in human rights legislation
HUMAN RIGHTS — nature and purpose
of human rights legislation
Frank Lapointe and Cultus Lake Park Board
sought to have a complaint filed by Nicole
Blank dismissed on the grounds that it was
not filed on time. The B.C. Human Rights
Tribunal declined to dismiss the complaint.
The Tribunal, in considering the respon
in the public interest to do so and the delay
does not prejudice the parties.
The Tribunal accepted medical documents
from July 2000, which recorded that
Ms. Ainscough was not adequately caring
for herself. In March 2001, the Public
Guardian and Trustee began to act on her
behalf. Although no explanation for the
delay in filing the complaint was offered,
the Tribunal concluded that it had taken
the Public Guardian some time to review
Ms. Ainscough’s affairs.
rine vessels, and contracting for marine carriage
of various commodities. It does not
perform any loading or unloading of cargo
and employs no longshoremen. Prism Sulphur
Corporation is Maple Shipping’s
biggest client.
Prism Sulphur Corporation argued that
Maple Shipping was a federal undertaking
because its functions were related to navigation
and shipping and consequently fell
under federal jurisdiction under the terms
of s. 91(10) of the Canadian Constitution.
The Tribunal found that the general rule
is that the regulation of labour relations
and employment, including human rights,
is under provincial jurisdiction, unless the
employment is in relation to a federal work
or undertaking.
The Tribunal found that Maple Shipping
would be a federal undertaking if its business
operations extended beyond the bor-
Blank was dealing with her complaint when
the human rights system in British Columbia
was in transition. The last occurrence of
the discrimination she experienced occurred
in September 2002. She was in contact
with the B.C. Human Rights Commission
and had been advised that she had
one year to file a complaint.
The Commission was abolished in
March 2003 and the legislation was
amended reducing the time period for filing
a complaint from one year to six months.
Since the delay was mainly attributable
to Ms. Ainscough’s mental and physical
disabilities, and it caused no prejudice to
Canada Safeway, the Tribunal declined to
dismiss the complaint.
Ainscough v. Canada Safeway Ltd.
(Aug. 19, 2003), CHRR Doc.
03-193, 2003 BCHRT 46
(Humphreys) (Eng. 8 pp.) [To be
reported in 47 C.H.R.R.]
ders of the province, or if it had relationships
with other companies that were sufficient
to qualify it as an interprovincial undertaking.
The Tribunal determined that
neither of these was true. Maple Shipping’s
own business operations did not extend
beyond the borders of the province. Further,
Maple Shipping functioned exclusively
as a broker for the shipping companies
it dealt with. Its operations were not so
integrally related to these federal undertakings
as to make it subject to federal rather
than provincial regulation for the purposes
of its employment regulation, including human
rights regulation.
The application was dismissed.
Andrew v. Prism Sulphur Corp.
(Aug. 21, 2003), CHRR Doc.
03-197, 2003 BCHRT 51 (Lyster)
(Eng. 13 pp.) [To be reported in 47
C.H.R.R.]
Ms. Blank filed her complaint in May 2003,
between 37 and 52 days after the six-
month deadline.
Under the new Code the Tribunal has
discretion to accept late complaints. In the
circumstances, the Tribunal concluded that
it was in the public interest to do so.
Blank v. Lapointe (Aug. 25, 2003)
CHRR Doc. 03-199, 2003 BCHRT
54 (Neuenfeldt) (Eng. 9 pp.) [To be
reported in 47 C.H.R.R.]
Shipping Agency Not Federal
JURISDICTION — company incorporated bulk cargo forwarding, chartering of ma-
Human Rights System in Transition
COMPLAINTS — delay and timeliness in dent’s application, recognized that Ms.
Human Rights Digest Vol. 4 No. 7
Man Denied Tenancy Because of Disability
HOUSING ACCOMMODATION — himself. He lives on a disability pension and
rental accommodation denied on the basis
of disability and source of income — DISABILITY
— housing accommodation denied
on the basis of anxiety — perceived
disability — SOURCE OF INCOME
housing accommodation denied to recipient
of disability benefits
DAMAGES — compensation for injury to
dignity and self-respect
The B.C. Human Rights Tribunal ruled that
John Vlake and Audrey Vlake discriminated
against William Tanner by denying him occupancy
of an apartment because of his
disability.
Mr. Tanner has a recurring mental illness
which results in his experiencing high levels
of anxiety. His psychiatrist describes him as
a quiet man with a limited ability to express
works part-time.
In February 2002 Mr. Tanner lived in an
apartment building that he found too
noisy. In his search for a
— new living situation he
found an ad placed by Mr.
and Mrs. Vlake offering an
apartment for rent in their
home. He spoke with Mrs.
Vlake on the phone and arranged
to see the apartment.
When she asked him
whether he was working, he replied that he
was living on a disability pension. Mrs.
Vlake immediately said that she could not
rent to him because “her husband would
not go for it”.
At the hearing, Mrs. Vlake agreed that
she had denied Mr. Tanner occupancy of
the apartment because of his disability. She
William Tanner was
denied rental of an
apartment because he
lives on a disability
pension.
explained that she and her husband were in
their seventies, and wanted to find a tenant
who could do some chores for them in exchange
for low rent. She imagined that a
person with a disability
might need help himself,
and she did not consider
herself and her husband able
to offer it. She expressed regret
for what had happened.
The Tribunal found that
Mr. Tanner was discrimi
nated against because of his
disability by Mr. and Mrs. Vlake. It ordered
them to pay Mr. Tanner $1,500 as compen
sation for the injury to his dignity.
Tanner v. Vlake (July 18, 2003),
CHRR Doc. 03-172, 2003 BCHRT
36 (Neuenfeldt) (Eng. 8 pp.) [To be
reported in 46 C.H.R.R.]
Briefly Noted
FEDERAL
Boutilier v. Canada (Treasury Board) (2003), CHRR Doc. 03-142,
2003 CHRT 20 (Mactavish, Groarke and Devins)
DAMAGES — REMEDIES / Decision on the damages and remedy
to be awarded to the complainants resulting from discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation. The complainants are
to be credited for the time they were obliged to take as a result
of the denial of marriage leave to participate in public same-sex
commitment ceremonies. Each complainant will also receive
$5,000 for pain and suffering. May 26, 2003. (Eng. 4 pp.)
Dawe v. Royal Canadian Mounted Police (2003), CHRR Doc.
03-175, 2003 FC 861 (Kelen J.)
APPEALS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW — HUMAN RIGHTS
COMMISSIONS / Application for judicial review of Canadian
Human Rights Commission decision to dismiss complaint of discrimination
in employment on the basis of disability. Dismissed:
July 10, 2003. (Eng. 27 pp.)
Dawson v. Eskasoni Indian Band (2003), CHRR Doc. 03-141,
2003 CHRT 22 (Sinclair)
DAMAGES / Decision on the amount to be awarded for pain
and suffering resulting from discrimination on the basis of race
(non-band member refused social assistance benefits). The Tribunal
determined that the 1998 amendment raising the maximum
amount to $20,000 does not apply. The complainant was
awarded $5,000. June 17, 2003. (Eng. 8 pp.)
Malo v. Caza (No. 2) (2003), CHRR Doc. 03-174, 2003 FC 811
(Pinard J.)
BOARDS OF INQUIRY / TRIBUNALS / Application by the Canadian
Human Rights Commission for judicial review of decision
Caza v. Télé-Métropole Inc. (No. 2) (2002), 43 C.H.R.R.
D/336 (C.H.R.T.), which dismissed a motion by the Canadian
Human Rights Commission and the complainant Caza requesting
that the Tribunal member disqualify himself due to bias. Dismissed:
July 4, 2003. (Fr. 18 pp.)
Montreuil v. National Bank of Canada (2003), CHRR Doc.
03-162, 2003 CHRT 27 (Mactavish)
COMPLAINTS / Application by respondent to have complaint
of discrimination (T795/4503) in employment on the basis of
sex (refusal to hire transsexual person) dismissed because the
complainant has admitted that she is not a transsexual person
in a period of transition in order to become female since she acknowledged
that she had no intention of proceeding with sex
reassignment surgery. Dismissed: July 11, 2003. (Eng. 5 pp. / Fr.
5 pp.)
Naik v. Canada (Attorney General) (2003), CHRR Doc. 03-176,
2003 FCT 783 (Pinard J.)
APPEALS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW — HUMAN RIGHTS
COMMISSIONS / Application for judicial review of Canadian
Human Rights Commission decision to dismiss complaint of dis
Vol. 4 No. 7 Human Rights Digest
crimination in the provision of services by the Department of
Citizenship and Immigration on the basis of family status and
gender. Allowed: June 26, 2003. (Eng. 8 pp.)
Sveinson v. Canada (Attorney General) (2003), CHRR Doc.
03-143, 2003 FCA 259 (Evans, Létourneau and Sharlow JJ.A.)
APPEALS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW / Appeal of decision of an
Umpire (CUB 54429) holding that a pay equity payment, which
the applicant received pursuant to an order of the Canadian
Human Rights Tribunal, should be allocated for employment insurance
purposes to her earnings in the year she received the
payment, not the years in respect of which it was paid. Dismissed:
June 9, 2003. (Eng. 11 pp.)
ALBERTA
Cross v. International Paper Canada Inc. (2003), CHRR Doc.
03-155 (Alta. H.R.P.; Tolley)
DISABILITY / Decision on complaint of discrimination in employment
on the basis of disability (missing fingertip). Dismissed:
June 26, 2003. (Eng. 10 pp.)
Kaufmann v. Stony Plain (Town) (2003), CHRR Doc. 03-149 (Alta.
H.R.P.; Scragg)
PROCEDURE / Decision dismissing complaint because the
complainant did not appear at the hearing. June 13, 2003.
(Eng. 2 pp.)
BRITISH COLUMBIA
Ali v. Grewal (2003), CHRR Doc. 03-137, 2003 BCHRT 24
(Neuenfeldt)
RACE, COLOUR AND PLACE OF ORIGIN / Decision on complaint
of discrimination in employment on the basis of race, col-
our and place of origin. Dismissed: June 10, 2003. (Eng. 23 pp.)
Chan v. Bell Mobility Inc. (2003), CHRR Doc. 03-140, 2003
BCHRT 27 (Beharrell)
JURISDICTION — COMPLAINTS / Decision on application by
the respondent to dismiss a complaint of discrimination in employment
on the basis of age because the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction
to hear a complaint concerning a telecommunications
company. Complaint dismissed: June 13, 2003. (Eng. 3 pp.)
Cook v. British Columbia (Ministry of Education) (2003), CHRR
Doc. 03-138, 2003 BCHRT 25 (Lyster)
PARTIES / Decision on applications for intervener status by the
Citizens Research Institute and Youthquest! Lesbian and Gay
Youth Society of British Columbia on a complaint of discrimination
in the provision of public services on the basis of sexual orientation.
Dismissed: June 11, 2003. (Eng. 6 pp.)
Derksen v. Myert Corps Inc. (2003), CHRR Doc. 03-173, 2003
BCHRT 37 (Lyster)
COMPLAINTS / Application by respondent to dismiss complaint
of discrimination in employment on the basis of religion
because the complaint is “false”. Denied: July 23, 2003. (Eng. 3
pp.)
Huppie v. Fording Coal Ltd. (2003), CHRR Doc. 03-156, 2003
BCHRT 29 (Lyster)
PROCEDURE — JURISDICTION / Application to defer the
hearing of a complaint of discrimination in employment to a
date pending the outcome of an arbitration proceeding. Allowed
(further consideration of the complaint is deferred until
the outcome of the grievance arbitration is received): June 26,
2003. (Eng. 7 pp.)
Metzger v. British Columbia (Ministry of Competition, Science
and Enterprise) (2003), CHRR Doc. 03-169, 2003 BCHRT 35
(Humphreys)
PROCEDURE — JURISDICTION / Application to defer the
hearing of a complaint of discrimination in employment to a
date pending the outcome of an arbitration proceeding. Allowed
(further consideration of the complaint is deferred until
the outcome of the grievance arbitration is received): July 16,
2003. (Eng. 4 pp.)
O’Hara v. British Columbia (Human Rights Comm.) (2003),
CHRR Doc. 03-166, 2003 BCCA 139 (Southin, Braidwood and
Hall JJ.A.)
APPEALS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW — HUMAN RIGHTS
COMMISSIONS / Appeal of decision (2002), CHRR Doc.
02-085 (B.C.S.C.) dismissing an application for judicial review
of a Human Rights Commission decision dismissing a complaint
of discrimination in employment on the basis of disability. Dismissed:
Feb. 28, 2003. (Eng. 6 pp.)
Scott v. CPAC (Crescent Gardens) Inc. (2003), CHRR Doc. 03-168,
2003 BCSC 222 (Gray J.)
APPEALS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW — HUMAN RIGHTS
COMMISSIONS — SETTLEMENT/ Application for judicial review
of a Human Rights Commission decision to dismiss a complaint
of discrimination in employment on the basis of family
status because the complainant refused a reasonable settlement
offer and pursuing the complaint would not further the
purposes of the Human Rights Code. Dismissed: Feb. 10, 2003.
(Eng. 5 pp.)
Williams v. Chintz & Co. Decorative Furnishings Inc. (2003),
CHRR Doc. 03-157, 2003 BCHRT 30 (Humphreys)
DISABILITY / Decision regarding complaint of discrimination in
employment on the basis of disability (back injury). Dismissed:
July 3, 2003. (Eng. 24 pp.)
Yuan v. British Columbia (Human Rights Comm.) (2003), CHRR
Doc. 03-167, 2003 BCSC 461 (Melvin J.)
APPEALS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW — HUMAN RIGHTS
COMMISSIONS / Application for judicial review of a Human
Rights Commission decision dismissing a complaint of discrimination
in employment on the basis of disability. Dismissed: Mar.
26, 2003. (Eng. 5 pp.)
Human Rights Digest Vol. 4 No. 7
NOVA SCOTIA
Bobbitt v. Royal Canadian Legion, Branch 19 (2003), CHRR Doc.
03-185 (N.S. Bd.Inq.; Trainor)
DISABILITY — EVIDENCE / Decision on complaint of discrimination
in employment on the basis of disability (knee injury).
Allowed: May 23, 2003. (Eng. 27 pp.)
ONTARIO
Epstein v. York Condominium Corp. No. 67 (2003), CHRR Doc.
03-170, 2003 HRTO 14 (Garfield)
PARTIES / Application to add individual as a respondent in
complaint of discrimination in the provision of housing on the
basis of creed. Granted: July 17, 2003. (Eng. 13 pp.)
Weiher v. Polhill (2003), CHRR Doc. 03-164, 2003 HRTO 13
(Faughnan)
HOUSING ACCOMMODATION — DISABILITY / Decision
regarding discrimination in the provision of housing accommodation
on the basis of disability. Allowed: July 11, 2003. (Eng.
36 pp.)
QUEBEC
Québec (Comm. des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse)
c. Bétit (2003), CHRR Doc. 03-148, 2003 QCTDP 94
(Brossard J.)
RACE, COLOUR AND PLACE OF ORIGIN — HOUSING ACCOMMODATION
/ Décision (200-53-000023-023 (Québec))
concernant une plainte de discrimination fondée sur l’origine
ethnique ou nationale, la race et la couleur en refusant de
louer un logement. Accueillie: 28 mai 2003. (Fr. 11 pp.)
Québec (Comm. des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse)
c. Lacombe (2003), CHRR Doc. 03-145, 2003 QCTDP 91
(Brossard J.)
AGE DISCRIMINATION — HOUSING ACCOMMODATION
/ Décision (505-53-000004-025 (Longueuil)) concernant une
plainte de discrimination fondée sur lâge en refusant de louer
un logement aux moins de 25 ans. Accueillie: 16 mai 2003. (Fr.
8 pp.)
Québec (Comm. des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse)
c. Restaurant Amilaus (2003), CHRR Doc. 03-144, 2003
QCTDP 90 (Brossard J.)
DISABILITY — CIVIL STATUS / Décision (560-53-000002024
(Labelle)) concernant une plainte de discrimination dans
l’embauche (cuisinière) en raison du lien avec le conjoint de fait
porteur de l’hépatite C. Accueillie: 22 avril 2003. (Fr. 4 pp.)
Québec (Comm. des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse)
c. Vallée (2003), CHRR Doc. 03-147, 2003 QCTDP 95
(Rivet J.)
AGE DISCRIMINATION — SOCIAL CONDITION / Décision
(500-53-000177-020 (Montréal)) concernant une plainte de
discrimination fondée sur l’exploitation d’une personne âgée.
Accueillie: 3 juin 2003. (Fr. 26 pp.)
Québec (Comm. des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse)
et Kako c. Martin (2003), CHRR Doc. 03-146, 2003
QCTDP 92 (Brossard J.)
RACE, COLOUR AND PLACE OF ORIGIN — HOUSING ACCOMMODATION
/ Décision (455-53-000003-027 (Bedford))
concernant une plainte de discrimination fondée sur l’origine
ethnique ou nationale, la race et la couleur en refusant de
louer un logement. Rejetée: 21 mai 2003. (Fr. 5 pp.)
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